Millions of tourists now visit Mexico and Peru to see the remnants of the Maya, Aztec, and Inca civilizations. [ix] Sacolick, Bennet S. & Grigsby, Wayne W, Jr., Special Operations/Conventional Forces Interdependence: A Critical Role in Prevent, Shape, Win, Army Magazine, JUN 2012, 39-40. We in the military, in my opinion, follow the Behavioralist school of political theory as an institution- quite consciously, are unconscious Positivists in philosophical outlook- both individually and institutionally, and yet we pretend to be Rational Choice Theorists. We will do all of this while we continue down a path that relegates us to being little better than our conventional brethren in terms of operational and strategic prowess. It prioritizes education and training over platforms and technology as well as persistent engagement over drone strikes, direct action raids, and Hollywood movies. Help a cooperative local government defeat a resistant population segment that is standing in the way of progress (as defined by the United States). These two occurrences arguably have brought Special Operations to a level similar to the rest of DoD wherein the most important priority among the hierarchy is the growth of the bureaucracy. I think is what Robert has been saying in a number of comments. [xix] The idea that one can tell at a glance what needs to be done and, although usually applied to looking at terrain, some, including Clausewitz, have used it to describe something beyond just terrain. Its SOF opposite, Special Warfare, is usually associated with Unconventional Warfare and COIN, but in truth includes those operations of long duration and limited footprint wherein a politically sensitive situation precludes a large foreign force on the ground. Social learning-in-action would emphasize the requirement to learn while we are acting, although social entanglement (merging quantum entanglement with social efforts) might be more descriptive of the reality. Yes, this is going to be hard and it is a very complex area, but I don't think it is totally unmanageable or even unmeasurable. Aztecs, Inca, and Maya who escaped the iron swords and gunpowder of the Europeans instead suffered the old world diseases that accompanied the explorers. Its certainly a sticky issue and Im not sure what the right mix of security and positive public affairs efforts are. And one can use art, I'd argue, to re-imagine one's mission- all the while not straying too far outside of one's constraints. Then came the UW moment from my SF past when I asked him to explain what he meant by his comment even though "I already knew". That is, they encompass so much that they are rendered almost useless. Thru the same lens they would have recognized what events indicate discipline and control and what events reflect anxiety, panic, fear and hysteria. In the old days we might have known that our goal -- via containment, etc. [v] Art in this case refers to military art, but also to innovation and Mission Command as well the concepts of multi-framing, learning-in-action, and the afore-mentioned critical and creative thinking. [v] White, Curtis, The Middle Mind: Why Americans Dont Think For Themselves, HarperOne, 2004, 7. I dont ever remember reading anything where General Lee thought he could defeat and outright destroy the Army of the Potomac so his chosen course of action was one based on influencing the power base, the northern citizenry correct? The Theory of War (Continued) Offense Contributes striking power. Grant---I have been following your writings for a long number of years---this one is complex and has about three or four major points depending on interpretation---will respond but need to mull over a response as the points are both intriguing and very valid. The Inca Empire shared a fate similar to that of the Aztec, but at the hands of a conquistador more sinister than Cortez. The Human Factor: The Enduring Relevance of Protecting Civilians in Future Wars. Emerging from a 101010 collection of city-states with no central government, the Maya reached a cultural peak between A.D. 250250250 and 900900900. The human domain, a conceptualization of the influence that populations have on military operations, is one way of viewing reality. Russia and Ukraine battle daily in the sky. That we have been unable to incorporate the so-called lessons of the early days of Iraq into our operations in Afghanistan should cause us to seriously question the validity and universality of those lessons. What I don't like is the idea that as long as it is hard we should not try and simply leave it to others to figure out. I don't mean to nitpick, as your example is notional, and I am reading a little between the lines. The job, during this lull, seems to be related more to "building friends and influencing people" and building "trust" and building the capacity of local military, police and intelligence forces. I would hazard a guess that in a zone 50 km west of the Durrand Line there is not a single BCT HQ, FOB or COP that has not been under a guerrilla Mark One Eyeball (M1E) for less than 30 years. And it does in fact represent a number of UW deployments by ODAs in th 60/70s. The intelligence warfighting function tasks facilitate the commanders visualization and understanding of the threat and other relevant aspects of the operational environment. while surfing the internet and posting on such open and visible places as Facebook. The alternative, and the militarys current preferred philosophy, is the technically rational approach. Meanwhile, are we flailing about without a coherent way to attack and destroy the terrorists power base because weve neglected to correctly identify what their power base is and how best to go about attacking it? HERE is the issue that was recently discussed with a Robert Bunker over on the SWJ El Centro site. The belief that a well informed insight into the cultural environment of a typical Afghan village would equip you to deal with an armed opponent strikes me as quite absurd. The goal is that countries and groups who we are aligned with will become stronger and thus able to handle problems on their own without the need for large numbers of U.S. troops, which arguably get in the way of long-term progress anyway. Centers of Gravity analysis, the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), and Lines of Effort tools are just a few examples of concepts that appear in military doctrine with few, if any, references. It could be extremely beneficial if we allowed our people to openly look for information that our enemies are posting openly, yet we need to restrict or control exactly how and what our own people are posting when they are in theater. For example where there is a communal society with central leadership applying concepts that work in a democracy are useless and potentially counterproductive. But opting out of some of these cookies may affect your browsing experience. Interesting assessment on what I'm calling asymmetric surveillance approaches and much more. They do not need to go to small town America to watch us they have us in their country to watch. In order for SOF to best contribute to operations within the human domain I assert that we have to do two things: 1) ensure our doctrine and concepts support a more nuanced and dynamic approach to operations at the conceptual level and, 2) mimic at the operational and strategic levels the same kinds of things that make us special at the tactical level. Final questions: Does the "enemy" have a better understanding than we do as to our offensive strategy and our goals and objectives? I did not want to recall how many negative comments were made by countless officers about how stupid the insurgents were when in fact they are still in the fight and we are long gone from Iraq. This philosophy, for instance, leaves us enamored with metrics and attempting to quantify the unquantifiable. Yet SOF, following the Armys lead, is attempting to apply the physical domains constructs to this social domain. prior to embarking upon major military operations. These arent mechanized divisions we are attempting to outflank or terrorists we are killing in the human domain, these are very contextual-dependent groups of people whose values we are attempting to appreciate and either influence or employ to some effect. Kilcullen strangely got it right in his time in Iraq, but Gen. P misused it to establish the he won the surge comments and NOW Kilcullen is coming back to it in his latest book about seven years to late. [xxiii] UW is defined by US SOF as support to resistance (insurgent) forces to overthrow or disrupt a government or governing entity. Outlaw09, The mission became one of democratization. This is a realm consisting more of social facts (as opposed to physical facts such as artillery trajectories and tank speed), influenced more by language and culture, and largely constructed by the inhabitants as to meaning. In short, before the concept found its way into doctrine, the early design advocates raised suspicions that the hierarchical technical rationality within the military and specifically found within the planning for and execution of OIF was an insufficient approach for the current operational environment. The Bronx accent and studied gangsta saunter, desperation for a Big Mac and the bewilderment that ..everywhere is dirt bro.. didnt fit the Shalwar Kameez, parroted Arabic dogma, clapped out PKM and a Rambo belt of filthy decades old 7.62x54 in the middle of some godforsaken desert. "The goal is not more money, more missions, or more personnel. Human domains, or narratives, or strategic contexts, or ecosystems, or understanding situations, must, of necessity, begin with the self. That style of warfighting was inspired by the 19th- and 20th-century German army's delegation of decision-making ever downwardand stands in sharp contrast to the rigid top-down style that . Knowing one's enemy in and out is a cornerstone of guerrilla warfare or as the Iranians call it microwarfare. It must be something to do with the sort of personality attracted to these subjects, I imagine. is one of education- great point. Mentioned as inspiration for The Matrix films, one might compare the militarys paradigm to the Matrix: we are locked into it, but unaware of its existence. Win friends and influence people? ~ Army U Press. And yet, since the Political Science world has shifted towards Rational Choice Theory- we too have tried to stay edgy and cool, and likewise we have come up with all kinds of elegant models and metaphors to try to make life seem simple to us- turning abstractions into concrete concepts and teaching everyone the language of those abstractions through doctrine- which helps in communication, but does little for us in terms of critically knowing ourselves. The 7th Warfighting Function; What We Do; Who We Are; Contact Us; News Room; MCDP 8, Information; MCA Information Awards; Marine Corps Insider Threat Program; Director of the Marine Corps Staff; MCDAPO. Those who survived were forced to abandon their customs and live beneath Spanish rule for the next three centuries. Other reasons include the drawdown in manpower and money as well as the way the military institution uses concepts to try to align disparate and bureaucratic organizations towards a common goal.[xv]. (Thus as one might, in my day, have been required to explain one's ideas and proposals within the context of containing communism, likewise today might one benefit from explaining one's concepts and proposals within the context of promoting the Western way of life and governance?). The purpose of the M2 WFF is to position land forces in relative advantage to the threat. The other article about the Montagnards illustrates that no matter how well intentioned and capable the SF community and USAID is, they simply lack the numbers and self-security to make a large impact over large areas. Regardless, they are a formulaic-like approach linked linearly to the Armys concept of how it intends to fight and/or influence and win the nations wars or keep wars from happening. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Odierno, allegedly said recently, That is what I was missing in Iraq! Maneuver is the means by which commanders mass the effects of combat power to achieve surprise, shock, and momentum. Maybe I'm just becoming cynical in my old age, but it bothers me to no end that so many great people and huge amounts national capital have been expended in basically accomplishing what? What could be more logical, I think, than looking at human emotion and motivations, as tricky as it is to understand such things, perhaps even impossible and too mysterious? I have read and heard many who claim that the Army Warfighting Functions just create more red-tape and are not needed. monitor than our adversaries, those staff guys watching the screens have little understanding of the operational environment because most of them have no personal interaction with the environment outside of viewing it on their monitor, or adversaries have greater battlefield knowledge and understanding of all the systems that interact in it. An Examination of the Importance of Mosques, El Salvador Deploys Security Forces to Contain Criminal Groups, Honduras declares war against gangs and for control of popular narrative, Complexities and conveniences in the international drug trade: the involvement of Mexican criminal actors in the EU drug market, Mexico: Declassification of the Three Armed Conflicts Involving Drug Cartels on RULAC - The Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Technology, Data, & The Future of Warfare: A Review Essay by James Torrence, Rinaldo Nazzaro, Leader of the Neo-Nazi Terrorist GroupThe Base: Probable Linkages to the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM), A Social Network Analysis of Mexicos Dark Network Alliance Structure, Disentangling The Digital Battlefield: How the Internet Has Changed War, "Hybrid Warriors" GROUND TRUTH ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF WAR IN UKRAINE, DEFENSE SUPPORT TO STABILIZATION (DSS) A GUIDE FOR STABILIZATION PRACTITIONERS, Byte, With, and Through: How Special Operations and Cyber Command Can Support Each Other, Ukraines drone raid on Russian naval base was tactically innovative but not revolutionary, Improvised Anti-Vehicle Land Mines (IAVMs) in Mexico: Cartel Emergent Weaponry Use, Countering Chinese Overseas Police Influence Operations, Israel Rolls Out Legion-X Drone Swarm For The Urban Battlefield, The Great Equalizer: Irregular Warfare in the City. Any Medical Service Corps (MSC) officer worth his or her salt can quickly recite the 10 medical functions: medical mission command, medical treatment, hospitalization, medical evacuation, dental. It seems rather outlandish to me and reminds me a bit of Marxist literature predicting the rise of the disenfranchised and the oppressed (workers of the world unite!). It reminds me of the old WWII poster loose lips sinks ships. This positivist[xviii] philosophy would be bad if we simply believed it consciously. That the autodefensas exist and have the capacity to organize armed resistance to TCO's does not mean that they should be helped (timely